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Although it has long been known that time is a cue to causation, recent work with adults has 
demonstrated that causality can also influence the experience of time. In causal reordering 
(Bechlivanidis & Lagnado, 2013, 2016) adults tend to report the causally consistent order of 
events, rather than the correct temporal order. However, the effect has yet to be demonstrated 
in children. Across four pre-registered experiments, 4- to 10-year-old children (N=813) and 
adults (N=178) watched a 3-object Michotte-style ‘pseudocollision’. While in the canonical 
version of the clip object A collided with B, which then collided with object C (order: ABC), 
the pseudocollision involved the same spatial array of objects but featured object C moving 
before object B (order: ACB), with no collision between B and C. Participants were asked to 
judge the temporal order of events and whether object B collided with C. Across all age 
groups, participants were significantly more likely to judge that B collided with C in the 3-
object pseudocollision than in a 2-object control clip (where clear causal direction was 
lacking), despite the spatiotemporal relations between B and C being identical in the two 
clips (Experiments 1—3). Collision judgements and temporal order judgements were not 
entirely consistent, with some participants—particularly in the younger age range—basing 
their temporal order judgements on spatial rather than temporal information (Experiment 4). 
We conclude that in both children and adults, rather than causal impressions being 
determined only by the basic spatial-temporal properties of object movement, schemata are 
used in a top-down manner when interpreting perceptual displays.  
 
Keywords: causality, causal perception, cognitive development, Michottean launching, 
temporal cognition, time perception 
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Causality Influences Children’s and Adults’ Experience of Temporal Order 
The ability to learn about and represent causal relations is fundamental to our ability 
to navigate and understand the world as it enables us to interpret, explain and thus predict, 
events in our environment. A large body of research suggests that from a young age, children 
represent causal structures and use this information to guide their inferences and behaviour 
(see Muentener & Bonawitz, 2017; Sobel & Legare, 2014 for recent reviews). There is 
evidence that causal knowledge contributes to the development of children’s cognitive skills 
in a variety of domains (e.g., physical reasoning, Baillargeon, 2004; moral reasoning, 
Hamlin, 2013; generating explanations, Legare, 2012), thus demonstrating h t causality 
plays a central role in our experience of the world from early in life. 
It has long been known that temporal cues strongly influence people’s causal 
judgements. Both adults’ (e.g., Buehner & May, 2003; Lagnado & Sloman, 2006) and 
children’s (e.g., Bullock & Gelman, 1979; McCormack et al., 2015; Mendelson & Shultz, 
1976; Rankin & McCormack, 2013; Schlottmann et al., 1999) causal judgements show 
sensitivity to the principles of temporal priority (causes must precede their effects) and 
temporal contiguity (causally related events typically occur close together in time). More 
recently, it has become apparent that the relations between time and causality are in fact 
bidirectional—just as temporal cues influence our causal judgements, causal beliefs, in turn, 
influence the experience of time. Empirically, this influence of causal beliefs on temporal 
experience has been demonstrated in studies of two effects: causal binding and causal 
reordering. Studies of causal binding have shown that if one event A is believed to be the 
cause of another event B, the interval between the two events is perceived as shorter in 
duration than the same objective interval where the two events are not causally linked 
(Buehner 2012; 2015; Buehner & Humphreys, 2009). This represents a quantitative shift in 
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the perception of the temporal duration of an interval, such that causally-related events are 
drawn towards one another, or ‘bound’ together in time.  
A small number of recent studies have also demonstrated that causal beliefs can 
influence not only the subjective interval between events but also the temporal order in which 
the events are perceived to occur. In causal reordering (Bechlivanidis & Lagnado, 2013; 
2016) the temporal order in which events are perceived to have occurred is reversed, so that 
the experienced order of events is in line with causality. That is, if participants have a 
background belief that A is a cause of B, they are likely to report that A happened before B 
even when shown a sequence of events in which B happened first.  In the first study to 
demonstrate causal reordering, participants interacted with an on-scree  ‘physics world’ 
consisting of animated objects with different properties. After learning the properties of the 
objects and the causal relations between them, participants watched a clip that violated the 
learned causal order of events (i.e., if they had learned that A caused B, they saw a clip in 
which B happened before A). Participants were significantly more likely to report that events 
occurred in the order consistent with their causal beliefs than the objective temporal order 
(Bechlivanidis & Lagnado, 2013).  
Further evidence that causal beliefs influence adults’ experience of the temporal order 
of events comes from a study by Desantis and colleagues (2016). In this study participants 
watched a random-dot-kinematogram (RDK) on a computer screen and learned that pressing 
one key (e.g., left) caused the RDK motion to become briefly coherent in one direction (e.g., 
upwards), and pressing a different key (e.g., right) led to coherent motion in the opposite 
direction (e.g., downwards). Having learned this association, in a critical test phase, 
participants continued to execute keypresses, but sometimes the coherent motion of the RDK 
occurred before the keypress. For these trials, participants were more likely to (incorrectly) 
report that the motion occurred after their keypress when coherent motion was in the 
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expected (i.e. learnt) direction, compared with when it was in the unexpected, incongruent 
direction. This finding is indicative of causal reordering because participants apparently 
perceived events to occur in the order that reflected their learned causal beliefs (Desantis et 
al., 2016).  
The above causal reordering studies were based on causal relations that participants 
learned in an initial training phase. On the basis of this evidence alone, it is not possible to 
determine whether the reordering effect is dependent on recently learned rules about 
unfamiliar causes and effects, or whether it might represent a more general phenomenon that 
occurs in any situation that evokes an impression of causality. In addition, the Desantis et al. 
(2016) study involved intentional action by the participant, thus the reordering effect found 
might not be explained solely by causal beliefs (e.g., illusion of control could also play a 
role). To address these issues, Bechlivanidis and Lagnado (2016) designed a ‘one shot’ 
experiment that involved showing participants a single brief clip. The clip was based on a 
Michottean launching event (i.e. a simple collision between horizontally arranged two-
dimensional objects), adapted to involve three objects (ABC) instead of the typical two. 
Crucially, the third object in line (C) moved before the second object in line (B); i.e., the 
effect occurred before its presumed cause (see e.g., Figure 2a). Participants were significantly 
more likely to report perceiving that the events happened in an order consistent with 
causation (ABC) than in the objective temporal order (ACB). Participants also tended to 
(incorrectly) report that B made C move, suggesting that presumed causality—in the form of 
a collision between B and C—was the basis on which reordering occurred (Bechlivanidis & 
Lagnado, 2016). 
Taken together, these studies provide compelling evidence that adults temporally 
reorder events in line with their assumptions about causality, regardless of whether those 
assumptions are the result of recent learning or are based on perceptual cues. However, 
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nothing is currently known about the developmental origins of this phenomenon, despite the 
potential for developmental research to enhance our understanding of the nature of the links 
between causal and temporal cognition. Children’s causal cognition has been studied 
extensively (see Muentener & Bonawitz, 2017; Sobel & Legare, 2014 for recent reviews) and 
even infants show some sensitivity to causality in Michottean launching displays (e.g., Leslie 
& Keeble, 1987; Mascalzoni et al., 2013; Oakes, 1994; Schlottmann et al., 2002), but whether 
children’s causal impressions are strong and reliable enough to modulate their temporal order 
perception, as is true for adults, remains an open question.  
Research on whether causal beliefs can affect children’s temporal perception has so 
far been limited to a small number of developmental studies of causal binding—the perceived 
shortening of duration between two events that are believed to be causally related. Cavazzana 
and colleagues (2014, 2017) investigated the binding effect in 8- to 11-year-old children and 
adults. In each trial, participants watched letters of the alphabet rapidly flash up on a screen in 
a random order, and had to report which letter was on the screen when target events occurred. 
In some trials participants heard two tones (which were causally unrelated to one another) 
and in other trials participants pressed a key that resulted in a tone (causally related events), 
with the duration between the pairs of events identical in both cases. The adults’ judgements 
of which letters were on the screen when these target events occurred revealed the classic 
binding effect—the causally related keypress and tone were perceived as occurring closer 
together in time compared to the causally unrelated tones. However, the researchers failed to 
find evidence of causal binding in the children, leading them to conclude that the effect 
emerges late in development and may be linked to the development of higher-order cognitive 
processes (Cavazzana, Begliomini, & Bisiacchi, 2014, 2017).  
Although Cavazzana et al. concluded that this type of binding was a late-emerging 
phenomenon, their findings contrast with those of some recent studies using simplified child-
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friendly tasks. In these tasks, rather than retrospectively reporting the time at which an event 
occurred, participants either anticipated when they expected a target event (e.g., a rocket on a 
screen launching) to occur following an initial event (keypress or non-causal signal, Blakey et 
al., 2018), or gave a categorical estimation of the interval between the two events (Lorimer et 
al., under review). Children in both of these studies showed a binding effect—they were more 
likely to perceive the duration between two events to be shorter when there was a causal 
connection between them (i.e., when the rocket launch was caused by a keypress as opposed 
to preceded by an arbitrary signal). These findings suggest that susceptibility to causal 
binding is present in children as young as four years and that the magnitude of the binding 
effect does not increase developmentally, even into adulthood (Blakey et al., 2018; Lorimer 
et al., under review). Thus, it appears that, rather than being a late emerging phenomenon as 
suggested by the results of Cavazanna et al., causal binding reflects a fundamental way in 
which cognition shapes perception, and, at least from four years, is not modulated either by 
increased experience of causal relations or higher-order cognitive/reasoning processes that 
are known to change developmentally.  
Causal binding and reordering effects are both examples of causal beliefs influencing 
temporal experience, suggesting that the relationship between time and causality is 
bidirectional. It thus seems intuitively plausible that the emergence of these effects may 
follow the same developmental trajectory. However, it is difficult to generate developmental 
predictions about causal reordering effects based on studies of causal binding, because there 
are no detailed models of these effects that assume they have a common basis (indeed, there 
is considerable disagreement over the mechanisms underpinning causal binding, e.g., 
Borhani, Beck, & Haggard, 2017; Buehner, 2012; Faro, McGill, & Hastie, 2013; Merchant & 
Yarrow, 2016). Nevertheless, the recent studies on causal binding in children help motivate 
an examination of whether causal reordering is also observable in children. The aim of the 
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present study was to investigate for the first time whether children as young as four years are 
susceptible to the causal reordering effect, and if so, whether and how this changes across 
development. If we find evidence of reordering from a young age, this would provide further 
evidence for an early-developing bidirectional relation between time and causality, where 
causality already plays a critical role in children’s interpretation of the environment, 
including its temporal features. On the other hand, if children do not reorder, or if 
susceptibility to reordering increases with age, this would suggest that the role of causal 
beliefs in interpreting temporal order develops slowly, perhaps as a result of increasing 
experience with causal systems.  
The Michottean launching paradigm used by Bechlivanidis and Lagnado (2016) 
provides a very useful context in which to examine this issue, because the task does not 
involve children having to acquire familiarity with a new set of causal relations or make 
effortful causal inferences. While there is long-standing debate over how best to interpret the 
infancy data which has used Michottean-type tasks (Saxe & Carey, 2006; Cohen & Amsell, 
1998; Schlottmann, 2000; White, 2017), we can be confident that even preschoolers have a 
distinctive impression of physical causation when they see prototypical launch events 
(Schlottmann, Cole, Watts, & White, 2013; Schlottmann, Allan, Linderoth, & Hesketh, 
2002). Although in some circumstances young children are somewhat more tolerant than 
adults in ascribing causation to launching events that deviate from the prototypical launching 
sequence in most respects their explicit causal judgements are remarkably similar to those of 
adults (Schlottmann et al., 2013; see also Bechlivanidis, Schlottmann & Lagnado (2019) for 
recent evidence that adults are in fact more tolerant of deviation than previously assumed).  
General Method 
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Approval for this study (Experiments 1—4) was granted by XXX School of 
Psychology Ethics Committee, EC.16.02.09.4448R, XXX. All studies were pre-registereded 
and are available at the following links: Experiment1: XXX  (link removed as it includes 
author names), Experiment 2: XXX  (link removed as it includes author names), Experiment 
3: http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=z7e5xr (without author names); Experiment 4: 
http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=ip226r (without author names).  
Participants 
For each experiment we initially aimed to recruit approximately 30 participants per 
age group and use a within-subjects design (for the sake of economic use of participants), 
with participants viewing both of the critical clips (there were two in each experiment, the 3-
object pseudocollision and the control clip) in a counterbalanced order, yielding two 
conditions (pseudocollision first or second). Once we reached this sample size we tested for 
order effects; specifically, for each age group we tested whether the order in which 
participants saw the two critical clips influenced their responses for either of our measures 
(TOJ and CJ). For all four experiments, critical clip order influenced performance for at least 
one age group on at least one measure (see supplementary Table S1 Figure S1); thus, in each 
case we switched to a between-subjects design, whereby we proceeded to collect additional 
data to give approximately 30 participants per age group per condition, and only analysed the 
first of the two critical clips participants watched. That is, in the analyses reported below, 
participants contributed data points for either the pseudocollision clip or the control clip.  
The exact number of participants per experiment was determined by availability in 
schools and museums. Specifically, we did not turn away anyone who wanted to participate 
while we were in a given setting. To enable us to examine performance differences across 
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development and compare children and adults within the same model the child sample for 
each experiment was divided into multiple age groups.  
All participants were tested individually. Adults were either tested in a room at a 
university (undergraduate students) or at a local science museum (museum visitors). The 
adults tested at a university received course credit for participating. Children were either 
tested in a room at their school or at a local science museum and received a sticker for 
participating. 
Materials  
All experiments were programmed in Adobe Flex 4.6 and presented to participants on 
an Acer TravelMate P236 13.3” laptop. Examples of the clips presented in Experiment 1 are 
depicted in Figures 1 and 2. 
Design 
All Participants only took part in one of the four experiments. The following variables 
were randomized across participants: direction of object motion in clips (left to right, right to 
left); practice clip order; colour of the shapes (which varied between experiments). 
Coding and preliminary analyses 
For each critical clip we coded participants’ responses to (a) the TOJ question (shape 
selected (A, B, C) and whether it was correct/incorrect) and (b) the CJ question (yes/no and 
whether it was correct/incorrect). For each experiment we ran preliminary analyses to check 
for an effect of direction of motion (left-right or right-left) on either of our response variables. 
As we found no significant influence of motion direction, data were collapsed across this 
variable for all subsequent analyses. 
Experiment 1 
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In Experiment 1, we modified Bechlivanidis and Lagnado’s (2016) Experiment 1 to 
make it more appropriate for young children. The critical clips were identical in terms of their 
spatiotemporal features to those used in the original study. However, whereas participants in 
Bechlivanidis and Lagnado’s (2016) experiment were required to order all of the events that 
occurred via drag and drop, we greatly simplified the response variables to reduce task 
demands. In the critical clips for our task, participants were asked a single temporal order 
judgement (TOJ) question (“Which square started moving last?”) and a single collision 
judgement (CJ) question (“Did square B bump into square C, yes or no?” see Method for 
further details). We also introduced 4 non-causal practice clips (two involving two objects 
and two involving three objects; Figure 1a—b) that participants watched before viewing the 
critical clips, to familiarize participants with the type of clip they would be watching and 
what they should be attending to. 
Method 
Participants. Our final sample consisted of 61 adults (41 female, 3-object: N = 31, 
Mage =29 years; 2-object: N = 30, Mage = 23 years) and 282 children (164 female). An 
additional four children were tested but excluded because they were inattentive (N = 3) or did 
not understand the task instructions (N = 1). The child sample was divided into 4 age groups 
per condition: 4- to 6-year-olds (3-object: N = 35, Mage = 5 years 8 months; 2-object: N = 35, 
Mage = 5 years 4 months), 6- to 7-year-olds (3-object: N = 36, Mage= 7 years 2 months; 2-
object: N = 35, Mage = 7 years 0 months), 7- to 9-year-olds (3-object: N = 35, Mage= 8 years 8 
months; 2-object: N = 35, Mage = 8 years 5 months) and 9- to 10-year-olds (3-object: N = 36, 
Mage = 9 years 11 months; 2-object: N = 35, Mage = 9 years 9 months).  
Procedure. Participants were told that they would watch some short clips of squares 
moving around on the screen and answer some questions about what they saw. They were 
Development of Causal Reordering 
12 
 
told that they would only get to see each clip once so they should make sure to pay attention, 
and that they would know when each clip was going to start because they would see a ‘clock’ 
fill in from white to black (Figures 1 and 2), after which the squares would start to move, 
which was then demonstrated to them once. 
Practice clips. Participants first watched 4 non-causal practice clips (see Figure 1a), 
and were asked a TOJ question after each clip. At the start of each practice clip the squares 
were aligned vertically in columns at one side of the screen and they started to move 
horizontally one at a time, so there was no implied causal connection between the motion 
onsets of the squares.1 After each practice clip, participants saw a screen with the squares in 
their final configuration (i.e., where they ended up after the motion), and were asked a single 
TOJ question: either, “Which square started moving first?” or “Which square started moving 
last?” to establish their experience of the motion onset of the squares. These questions were 
asked in an alternating order across the four practice clips. The rationale for asking both of 
these questions was to encourage participants to attend to the motion of all of the squares. 
Given that children may not always accurately interpret the words “before” and “after” until 
at least 5 years of age (e.g., Blything & Cain 2016; Blything, Davies & Cain, 2015) we 
deliberately avoided the use of these terms.  
Figure 1 about here 
 Critical clips. The critical clips consisted of a 2-object control clip and a 3-object 
“pseudocollision” clip (Figure 2) presented in a counterbalanced order. The shapes in the 
critical clips – which were all squares in Experiment 1 – will henceforth be labelled A, B, and 
C. At the start of each critical clip the shapes were aligned horizontally. In the 3-object 
 
1 White (2017) reported strong impressions of causality for an array of four vertically aligned objects that were 
ゲｷﾏ┌ﾉデ;ﾐWﾗ┌ゲﾉ┞ けﾉ;┌ﾐIｴWSげく Hﾗ┘W┗Wヴが デｴW Sｷゲヮﾉ;┞ゲ ┌ゲWS ｷﾐ ｴｷゲ ゲデ┌S┞ ┘WヴW very different from our practice clips 
┘ｴWヴW デｴW ﾗHﾃWIデゲ ﾏﾗ┗WS ゲWヮ;ヴ;デWﾉ┞ ;ﾐS デｴWヴW ┘;ゲ ﾐﾗ けﾉ;┌ﾐIｴWヴげ ﾗHﾃWIデく  
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pseudocollision (Figure 2a), square A moved towards square B and stopped adjacent to it; 
immediately after this, square C started moving away from square B, and after 350 ms, 
square B started moving away from square A; at no stage did square B make contact with 
square C. All shapes moved at a speed of 30 mm/s. The 2-object control clip was identical to 
the 3-object pseudocollision, except that square A was not present (Figure 2b). Critically, the 
relative onset of motion of squares B and C was exactly the same in both clips.  
As in the practice clips the shapes remained in their final positions after each critical 
clip, and participants were asked a TOJ: “Which square started moving last?” This form of 
words was used rather than the more straightforward “Which square moved last?” because 
squares B and C stopped moving simultaneously (and so technically they both moved last). 
Participants were also asked a collision judgement (CJ) question about shapes B and C: “Did 
the (e.g.) black square (B) bump into the (e.g.) red square (C), yes or no?” and the 
experimenter pointed at the relevant squares on the screen as they asked this question. The 
aim of asking this was to establish whether children had the impression that B had collided 
with C.  
Figure 2 about here 
Pre-registered confirmatory analyses. To establish which of the age groups tested 
were susceptible to causal reordering, for each age group we used Chi-square tests to 
compare participants’ TOJ and CJ responses in the 2-object control clip and the 3-object 
pseudocollision (as a reminder, these clips were identical except for the inclusion/exclusion 
of object A). Where the assumptions for using the chi-square test were not met (i.e., expected 
values of < 5 in one or more cells) we used Fisher’s Exact Test. If participants were 
reordering events in line with an impression of causality, we would expect a significantly 
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greater proportion of participants’ TOJs and CJs to be accurate in the 2-object control clip 
than in the 3-object pseudocollision.  
Exploratory analyses. To further examine developmental changes in reordering we 
used binomial logistic regression conducted in R (R Core Team, 2017) to ascertain the effect 
of age group on the likelihood of responding correctly to (a) the TOJ question and (b) the CJ 
question for the 3-object pseudocollision. If the models revealed a significant effect of age 
group, planned pairwise comparisons were conducted with Tukey-adjusted p-values for 
multiple comparisons, to establish which age groups differed from one another. Correlation 
between our two measures (TOJs and CJs) was assessed by calculating Phi coefficients, 
which is a measure of association between two binary variables. Specifically, we were 
interested to know whether participants who reordered events B and C were more likely to 
report perceiving a collision between these two objects (and vice versa). 
Results 
Following Bechlivanidis and Lagnado (2016) and our pre-registered analysis plan, for 
the following analyses we excluded participants who, following the TOJ question, gave the 
nonsensical response that square A started moving last. This resulted in the exclusion of 
28/132 children (14 4- to 6-year-olds; seven 6- to 7-year-olds; ix 7- to 9-year-olds; one 9- to 
10-year-old) from the group who contributed data on the 3-object pseudocollision clip. No 
adults needed to be excluded on this basis.  
Practice clips. Performance in the 2-object practice clips ranged from 69% correct 
responses (4- to 6-year-olds) to 93% correct responses (adults). Performance in the 3-object 
practice clips ranged from 60% correct responses (4- to 6-year-olds) to 94% correct responses 
(adults, see Table S2 for full details). 
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Pre-registered confirmatory analyses. Across all age groups, the majority of 
participants responded correctly to the TOJ question (that B moved last) in the 2-object 
control clip (Figure 3a). Participants in all age groups were significantly more likely to 
respond correctly (say B started moving last) in the 2-object control clip than the 3-object 
pseudocollision (Chi-square tests: p < 0.001 for all, Table 1). Participants in all age groups 
were also significantly more likely to respond correctly (no) to the CJ question (e.g., “did the 
green (B) square bump into the red (C) square, yes or no?”, see Figure 3b) in the 2-object 
control clip than the 3-object pseudocollision (Chi-square tests: p ≤ 0.001 for all, Table 1). 
Figure 3 about here 
Table 1 about here 
Exploratory analyses. Logistic regression revealed that participants’ tendency to 
report the correct order of events (TOJ question) in the pseudocollision was significantly 
influenced by age group (Wald ぬ2 = 10.68, df = 4, p = 0.030). Posthoc contrasts with Tukey 
adjusted p-values for multiple comparisons revealed a significant difference between adults 
and 9- to 10-year-olds (log odds ratio = 1.54, p = 0.036), with adults being more likely to 
respond correctly/less likely to reorder. There were no other significant differences between 
groups after adjusting for multiple comparisons (p ≥ 0.124 for all other pairs of age groups, 
Table S3). Participants’ tendency to report perceiving a collision between objects B and C 
(CJ question) in the pseudocollision was also significantly influenced by age group (Wald ぬ2 
= 10.43, df = 4, p = 0.034). Posthoc contrasts with Tukey adjusted p-values for multiple 
comparisons revealed a significant difference between 9- to 10-year-olds and 7- to 9-year-
olds (log odds ratio = 1.72, p = 0.038), with the older children being more likely to perceive a 
collision. There were no other significant differences between age groups in responses to the 
CJ question after adjusting for multiple comparisons (p ≥ 0.470 for all other pairwise 
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comparisons). These patterns of responding with age group as a categorical predictor were in 
keeping with analyses of child data only when age in years was included as a continuous 
predictor (see Table S6). TOJs and CJs were significantly associated for the 3-object 
pseudocollision—participants who reordered events B and C were more likely to report 
perceiving a collision between those objects (Phi = 0.26, p = 0.002, see Table S7 for details 
per age group). 
Discussion 
Across all of the age groups tested, participants were significantly more likely to 
report the correct order of events (say that square B started moving last) in the 2-object 
control clip than the 3-object pseudocollision clip, despite the relative onset of motion of 
squares B and C being identical in both clips. The results for the 2-object clip provide 
evidence that participants of all ages were able to perceptually distinguish the relative onset 
of motion of squares B and C, as they almost always gave the correct response to the TOJ 
question in this case. This suggests that participants’ TOJs were influenced by the inclusion 
of square A, which gave the clip clear causal direction. In addition, all participants were 
significantly less likely to report perceiving contact between objects B and C in the 2-object 
control clip than the 3-object pseudocollision (i.e, they were more likely to correctly respond 
“no” to the CJ question in the former), which indicates that the causal impression generated 
by the pseudocollision was the basis for reordering. 
Adults in the present experiment were less likely to reorder than in Bechlivanidis and 
Lagnado’s (2016, Experiment 1) original one-shot study (42% vs. 83% reordering). This 
difference in performance is probably due to the inclusion of practice trials in the present 
task. Asking a TOJ question after each practice trial presumably causes participants to focus 
more on the temporal order of events, so when they get to the critical clips they have a good 
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idea what they should be attending to. In fact, given the long temporal interval (350 ms) 
between the motion of two objects and the fact that adults were expecting to be asked about 
the temporal order of events, it is perhaps surprising that we nevertheless still find evidence 
for reordering in almost half of the adults tested (in contrast, only 6% of adults responses 
were incorrect in the 3-object practice trials). While 9- to -10-year-olds were more likely to 
reorder events than adults in the 3-object pseudocollision, and more likely to report 
perceiving a collision between objects B and C than 7- to 9-year-olds, there was no clear 
developmental pattern in performance according to either of our measures.  
Although the data from Experiment 1 provided some initial evidence that children as 
young as four years reorder events in line with causal impressions, the fact that a large 
proportion of participants in the younger age groups gave the response that object A started 
moving last (41% in our youngest age group) and thus had to be excluded is unsatisfactory. 
This high level of exclusions makes it impossible to properly determine the developmental 
trajectory of the reordering phenomenon, as this hangs on how the A-responders would re-
distribute between B and C if they did not give the nonsensical A response. Why might 
participants—specifically, young children—say that A started moving last? Two features of 
Experiment 1 may have led children to respond in this way. First, while we deliberately 
avoided the use of the terms “before” and “after” given young children’s well-established 
difficulties with these terms, it is possible that the question “which square started moving 
last?” is also rather complex for young children—particularly the combination of “started” 
and “last”. Second, because we alternated the TOJ question between practice trials, either 
asking which square moved first or which square moved last, it is possible that in some cases 
children were expecting to be asked about which square moved first (rather than last) in the 
critical clip, and gave a response to that question instead (though note that if this were true we 
would expect the same issue to affect the 2-object control clip). In Experiment 2 we 
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addressed both these issues, with the aim of getting a clearer picture of the developmental 
trajectory of susceptibility to causal reordering. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2 we again presented participants with a 3-object pseudocollision and a 
2-object control clip. However, to prevent participants from responding “A” in the critical 
TOJ question, object A was a circle, whereas B and C were both squares, and we explicitly 
asked about the squares (Figure 2a[ii]). Participants were introduced to the different shapes at 
the start of the task, and they saw a practice clip involving a circle and two squares. To 
address the other issues that might have contributed to the high levels of A-responding in 
Experiment 1, we changed the TOJ so that for all clips (practice and critical) participants 
were asked “Which square moved first?” We also reduced the number of practice clips from 
four to two, as we suspected the extensive practice phase could have contributed to the 
decreased prevalence of reordering in adults compared to the level reported by Bechlivanidis 
and Lagnado (2016). 
Method 
 Participants. Our final sample consisted of 63 adults (56 female; 3-object: N = 30, 
Mage = 20 years; 2-object: N = 33, Mage = 20 years) and 207 children (127 female), none of 
whom had participated in Experiment 1. An additional four children were tested but excluded 
because of a lack of attention (N = 3) or insufficient English language skills (N = 1). The 
child sample was divided into 3 age groups per condition: 4- to 6-year-olds (3-object: N = 33, 
Mage = 5 years 5 months; 2-object: N = 32, Mage = 5 years 4 months), 6- to 8-year-olds (3-
object: N = 33, Mage = 7 years 4 months; 2-object: N = 32, Mage = 7 years 1 month) and 8- to 
10-year-olds (3-object: N = 33, Mage = 9 years 8 months; 2-object: N = 32, Mage = 9 years 1 
month).  
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 Materials. The materials were the same as in Experiment 1 except that object A was a 
circle and we changed the colour of the shapes to blue, orange and grey, as it occurred to us 
that red-green colour-blindness could have been an issue in Experiment 1. 
 Procedure. The task instructions were the same as for Experiment 1, with the 
addition that before viewing the practice clips participants were introduced to the different 
shapes (square and circle), and children in the youngest age group were asked to name the 
shapes (their data were excluded if they were unable to). 
 Practice clips. Participants watched two non-causal practice clips (Figure 1b) in a 
random order and were asked the same TOJ question after each one: “Which square moved 
first?” 
 Critical clips. The 2-object control clip was identical to the clip used in Experiment 
1. The 3-object test clip was identical except that object A was a circle instead of a square 
(Figure 2a[ii]). 
Results 
Practice clips. Performance in the 2-object practice clip ranged from 71% of 
participants responding correctly (4- to 6-year-olds) to 87% of participants responding 
correctly (adults). Performance in the 3-object practice clip ranged from 66% of participants 
responding correctly (4- to 6-year-olds and 6- to 8-year-olds) to 90% of participants 
responding correctly (adults, see Table S2 for full details).  
Pre-registered confirmatory analyses. Across all age groups, the majority of 
participants responded correctly to the TOJ question (that C moved first) in the 2-object 
control clip (Figure 4a). In contrast to Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 there was a clear 
pattern of decreasing response accuracy to the TOJ question for the 3-object pseudocollision 
(blue bars of Figure 4a): younger children were more likely to respond correctly than older 
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children and adults when asked “Which square moved first?” Comparisons of TOJ responses 
between the 2-object and 3-object clips revealed that while 8- to 10-year-olds and adults were 
significantly more likely to respond correctly in the 2-object clip than the 3-object clip (chi-
square tests, ps ≤ 0.003, Table 1), the 4- to 6- and 6- to 8-year-olds’ performance did not 
differ significantly between the two critical clips (Fisher’s Exact Test, ps > 0.082). 
Participants in all age groups were significantly more likely to say square B collided with 
square C in the 3-object pseudocollision than the 2-object control clip (Figure 4b, Chi-square 
tests: ps ≤ 0.002 for all, Table 1). 
Figure 4 about here 
 
Exploratory analyses. Logistic regression revealed that participants’ tendency to 
report the correct order of events (TOJ question) in the pseudocollision was significantly 
influenced by age group (Wald ぬ2 = 10.52, df = 3, p = 0.015). After correcting p-values for 
multiple comparisons (Tukey adjustment) the youngest children were significantly more 
likely to respond correctly/less likely to reorder than adults (log odds ratio = 1.90, p = 0.038). 
There were no other significant differences between groups after adjusting for multiple 
comparisons (p ≥ 0.065 for all other pairs of age groups, Table S4). Participants’ tendency to 
report perceiving a collision between objects B and C (CJ question) in the 3-object 
pseudocollision was not significantly influenced by age group (Wald ぬ2 = 4.97, df = 3, p = 
0.172). These patterns of responding with age group as a categorical predictor were in 
keeping with analyses of child data only when age in years was included as a continuous 
predictor (see Table S6). TOJs and CJs were significantly associated for the 3-object 
pseudocollision—participants who reordered events B and C were more likely to report 
perceiving a collision between those objects (Phi = 0.19, p = 0.029, see Table S7 for details 
per age group).  
Discussion 
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Our Experiment 2 adult data closely replicates the results of Experiment 1—we again 
found evidence for the reordering of events in line with causality, according to both the TOJ 
data and the CJ data. Interestingly, reducing the number of practice clips appeared to have 
little impact on adults’ susceptibility to reordering (we had speculated that including fewer 
practice clips might lead to more adults reordering), though we did make additional task 
modifications that could have reduced susceptibility (e.g., asking the same TOJ question 
throughout; only ever asking about the squares). However, by contrast to the findings of 
Experiment 1, children’s TOJs in Experiment 2 suggest that it is only from around 8 years of 
age that reordering of events in line with causal impressions emerges (as 8- to 10-year-olds 
was the youngest age group in which we found a significant difference in TOJ performance 
between the 2-object and 3-object clips, see Table 1), and that susceptibility to this effect 
increases with age. Somewhat surprisingly, the two youngest groups of children (4- to 6- and 
6- to 8-year-olds) were equally likely to correctly report the identity of the square that moved 
first (C) in the 2-object and 3-object clips and were highly accurate in both cases, providing 
no evidence that the inclusion of object A led them to reorder events in this version of the 
task. Furthermore, 4- to 6-year-olds were significantly more likely to report the correct order 
of events in the pseudocollision than adults. 
The child CJ data, on the other hand, largely mirror what we found in Experiment 1—
all age groups were significantly more likely to incorrectly report perceiving a collision in the 
3-object pseudocollision than the 2-object control clip, and responses did not differ 
significantly across age groups. Thus, we see an intriguing difference in the pattern of 
performance across our two measures for the youngest children—th ir CJs suggest that they 
viewed B as bumping into C in the 3-object clip, but they do not report reordering in their 
TOJs. Specifically, while almost all children in the youngest group provided the correct 
response to the TOJ question for both clips (providing no evidence for reordering), around 
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60% of them incorrectly reported perceiving a collision between B and C in the 3-object clip, 
which suggests that the inclusion of object A did generate an impression of causality for 
them.  
The results of Experiment 2 raise two distinct questions: (1) what might explain the 
difference in children’s TOJ responses between Experiments 1 and 2, and (2) how can we 
reconcile the difference between young children’s TOJ data and CJ data in Experiment 2? We 
will start by addressing the first question. One possibility is that young children really do 
experience the correct order of events in the 3-object clip (i.e., the increasing susceptibility to 
reordering with age result of Experiment 2 is valid) but something about the procedure in 
Experiment 1 led them to give answers that misleadingly suggested they reordered the events. 
Alternatively, perhaps children really do reorder events in line with causality (i.e., the 
Experiment 1 TOJ result is valid), but something about the procedure in Experiment 2 leads 
them to give an answer that misleadingly suggests they did not reorder the events. Finally, it 
seems feasible that the results of both experiments are valid, but the modifications we made 
to the procedure in Experiment 2 led young children to ignore object A (circle) and focus 
solely on the two squares; thus they performed comparably in the 2-object and 3-object clips.  
To elaborate on this potential ‘ignore object A’ explanation for the Experiment 2 TOJ 
data: in Experiment 1 the practice trials encouraged participants to attend to the entire display 
because all shapes were squares, and the TOJ question differed between clips—sometimes 
participants were asked about which square moved first, and sometimes about which moved 
last. Thus, when they saw the critical clip they were likely attending to the entire display, 
including object A, which is presumably critical for the reordering effect to occur given that 
without attending to object A, the 3-object clip is identical to the 2-object control clip. During 
the practice trials of Experiment 2, on the other hand, participants were primed to attend only 
to the 2 squares (B and C), as they were only ever asked about these shapes, and furthermore 
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they were only ever asked which one moved first. Thus, when they saw the 3-object 
pseudocollision they may have completely ignored the circle and focussed their attention only 
on the two squares (B and C), and specifically on which one moved first (anecdotally, some 
children reported that they were using this strategy). 
If this explanation is correct, then why were younger children’s TOJs more affected 
by the changes to the task (and adults apparently unaffected)? One possibility is that the 
causal impression generated by the clip is more irresistible to older children and adults 
because of their more extensive experience of a variety of causal systems and, hence, stronger 
priors—perhaps we become less able to ‘escape’ the impression of causality as we get older 
(Bechlivanidis, 2015). 
Turning to the second question of how to reconcile the difference between young 
children’s TOJ data and CJ data in Experiment 2, we see two possibilities. First, perhaps 
young children’s CJ data, which in both experiments suggests they had a causal impression, 
could be explained by children glossing the test question as a question about whether there 
was a collision in the clip rather than interpreting it as a question about B and C. Specifically, 
perhaps these young children incorrectly say “yes” because they do perceive a collision 
(between objects A and B), but they do not actually perceive contact between objects B and 
C. (We note that one difficulty with this interpretation is that it seems inconsistent with the 
‘ignore A’ explanation of the young children’s TOJ data, because it suggests that children 
paid sufficient attention to A to perceive it making contact with B). The second possibility is 
that both TOJ and CJ data are valid in Experiment 2, i.e., there is a genuine difference 
between how collision perception and temporal order perception are affected by the causality 
manipulation in the youngest group. That is, perhaps in this youngest group, participants have 
the impression that B collided with C, but their temporal order judgements are not affected by 
the causality manipulation in the way that older participants’ judgements are.  
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In Experiment 3 we attempted to reduce the likelihood of participants engaging in an 
‘ignore A’ strategy by presenting a series of practice clips that encouraged them to attend to 
all three shapes. If only attending to objects B and C was driving the pattern of TOJ responses 
in Experiment 2, then young children should revert to reordering (replicating the results of 
Experiment 1). If on the other hand younger children really are less susceptible to causal 
reordering then we should replicate the results of Experiment 2. 
Experiment 3 
The critical clips and questions that followed were the same as in Experiment 2 
(Figure 2a[ii] and 2b). However, to encourage participants to attend to all of the shapes 
(which may not have been the case in Experiment 2 and could explain the lack of reordering 
in young children compared to in Experiment 1) we made some changes to the practice clips. 
Specifically, we aimed to create a situation in which, by the time the critical clips were 
viewed, participants did not know which shape they would be asked about. We did this by 
varying which object we asked about between practice trials: on some trials we asked which 
shape moved first, and in others we asked which circle moved first. Then, on the critical 
trials we asked which square moved first (Figure 1c). 
Method 
 Participants. Our final sample consisted of 54 adults (40 female, 3-object: N = 28, 
Mage = 19 years; 2-object: N = 26, Mage = 19 years) and 197 children (119 female), none of 
whom had participated in Experiments 1—2. An additional two children were tested but 
excluded because they were inattentive (N=1), or because they repeatedly responded “don’t 
know” to the questions (N=1). The child sample was divided into 3 age groups per condition: 
4- to 6-year-olds (3-object: N = 34, Mage = 5 years 1 month; 2-object: N = 32, Mage = 5 years 
5 months), 6- to 8-year-olds (3-object: N = 34, Mage = 7 years 1 month; 2-object: N = 31, Mage 
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= 7 years 0 months) and 8- to 10-year-olds (3-object: N = 34, Mage = 9 years 7 months; 2-
object: N = 31, Mage = 9 years 1 month). 
 Materials. The materials were the same as in Experiments 1 and 2 but we again 
changed the colours of the shapes to red, blue and yellow (because a few of the youngest 
children were unsure of the colour grey in Experiment 2). 
 Procedure. Participants saw three non-causal practice clips (Figure 1 c): two clips 
with one square and one circle, and one clip with two circles and a square. After the 2-object 
practice clips participants were asked “which shape moved first?” and the correct answer was 
the circle for one clip, and the square for the other clip. After the 3-object practice clip 
participants were asked “which circle moved first?” The critical clips (2-object control clip 
and 3-object pseudocollision) were the same as in Experiment 2 (Figure 2a[ii] and 2b). 
Results 
Practice clips. Performance in the 2-object practice clips ranged from 76% of 
participants responding correctly (4- to 6-year-olds) to 95% of participants responding 
correctly (adults). Performance in the 3-object practice clip ranged from 55% of participants 
responding correctly (4- to 6-year-olds) to 94% of participants responding correctly (adults, 
see Table S2 for full details). 
Pre-registered confirmatory analyses. Across all age groups, the majority of 
participants responded correctly to the TOJ question (that C moved first) in the 2-object 
control clip (Figure 5a). As in Experiment 2, there was a pattern of decreasing response 
accuracy in the TOJ question for the 3-object pseudocollision (blue bars of Figure 5a): 
younger children were again more likely to respond correctly than older children and adults 
when asked “Which square moved first?” Comparisons of TOJ responses between the 2-
object and 3-object clips revealed that while 6- to 8-year-olds, 8- to 10-year-olds and adults 
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were significantly more likely to respond correctly in the 2-object clip (Chi square tests, ps ≤ 
0.002, Table 1), the 4- to 6-year-olds’ performance did not differ significantly between the 
two critical clips (Fisher’s Exact Test, p = 0.108, Table 1). As in Experiments 1 and 2, 
participants in all age groups were significantly more likely to say square B collided with 
square C in the 3-object pseudocollision than the 2-object control clip (Figure 5b, Chi-square 
tests: ps ≤ 0.017 for all, Table 1). 
Figure 5 about here 
Exploratory analyses. Logistic regression revealed that participants’ tendency to 
report the correct order of events (TOJ question) in the pseudocollision was significantly 
influenced by age group (Wald ぬ2 = 11.32, df = 3, p = 0.010). Posthoc contrasts with Tukey 
adjusted p-values for multiple comparisons revealed a significant difference between 4- to 6-
year-olds and 8- to 10-year-olds (log odds ratio = 1.69, p = 0.015), with the youngest children 
being more likely to respond correctly/less likely to reorder than the oldest children. There 
were no other significant differences between groups after adjusting for multiple comparisons 
(ps ≥ 0.124 for all other pairs of age groups, Table S5). Participants’ tendency to report 
perceiving a collision between objects B and C (CJ question) in the 3-object pseudocollision 
was not significantly influenced by age group (Wald ぬ2 = 1.20, df = 3, p = 0.754). These 
patterns of responding with age group as a categorical predictor were in keeping with 
analyses of child data only when age in years was included as a continuous predictor (see 
Table S6). TOJs and CJs were significantly associated for the 3-object pseudocollision—
participants who reordered events B and C were more likely to report perceiving a collision 
between those objects (Phi = 0.23, p = 0.010, see Table S7 for details per age group).  
Discussion 
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In Experiment 3, we once again replicated our adult results. Thus, while including 
practice clips (and potentially simplifying the response measures) reduces susceptibility to 
causal reordering compared with in a ‘one-shot’ experiment where participants only see the 
critical clip, it seems that the number and nature of the practice clips does not influence 
adults’ performance. Even using our simplified paradigm, around 40% of adults reorder the 
events, and 40-60% incorrectly report perceiving contact between objects B and C. 
The child data from Experiment 3 is largely comparable to that obtained in 
Experiment 2—TOJ accuracy for the 3-object pseudocollision decreases with age (8- to -10-
year-olds were significantly less accurate than 4- to 6-year-olds), and once again there is a 
discrepancy between the youngest children’s TOJ responses and their CJ responses. Thus, we 
did not find any evidence that encouraging young children to attend to all of the objects in the 
display made them more likely to reorder events in line with causality. It is therefore 
tempting to conclude that young children really are less susceptible to causal reordering than 
older children and adults. This conclusion, though, still leaves us to explain why the youngest 
children’s CJ responses resembled those of adults—there was no significant difference 
between age groups for the pseudocollision CJ responses. As we pointed out above, there are 
two possible reasons for this: i) either it is the case that these c ildren’s CJ data is explained 
by a tendency to interpret the test question as being about whether there was a collision (as 
opposed to where the collision occurred) or, ii) more radically, children’s perception of 
collision are affected by the causality manipulation but their temporal order judgements are 
not.  
However, a further possible explanation for the observed data remains, which was 
raised by some anecdotal observations while running Experiment 3 with the younger 
children. First, a handful of children spontaneously gave a response to the TOJ question for 
the 3-object pseudocollision (responding that square C moved first) before the experimenter 
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had asked the question. This was despite the fact that, based on the practice trials, the 
experimenter might feasibly have asked “which shape moved first?”, or “which circle moved 
first?” to which the correct answer would have been object A/the circle in both cases. This 
suggests that these participants may have been responding to something other than the 
question being asked. Second, one 4-year-old correctly gave the response ‘C’, and then 
spontaneously said “because it’s in the lead!” This raises the possibility that some children, 
rather than reporting the motion onset, may be reporting the final spatial position of the 
objects, taking into account the direction of movement, and this misinterpretation may be 
more common for younger children. That is, when asked “Which square moved first?” they 
respond to the question “Which came first”, or which went furthest to the right (if motion 
direction is left-to-right), which is object C. In addition, spontaneous verbalizations by some 
children also suggested that the TOJ question was being misinterpreted—for example, some 
children responded that C moved first, but then went on to describe events along the lines of 
“A moved and hit B, and then that moved and hit C”, which was incompatible with the TOJ 
response they gave. Finally, it seems unlikely that 4- to 6-year-olds would only respond 
correctly 52% of the time in the 3-object practice trial, but 83% of the time in the 3-object 
pseudocollision given that the two clips were similar in terms of their complexity (they both 
involved three objects, and the relative motion onsets of the objects were identical in the two 
clip types). 
If some children are inappropriately responding in this way (i.e., giving their answer 
on the basis of spatial position on the screen rather reporting temporal order), this could also 
explain the high levels of A-responding in Experiment 1. Recall that around 40% of the 
youngest age group gave the response “A” when asked “Which square started moving last?” 
This seemed baffling as square A was quite clearly the first object to move, but makes sense 
if some children are responding on the basis of the objects’ final positions (considering 
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direction of movement), as outlined above. Under this account, object A “came last”—it 
finished spatially “behind” squares B and C. If we assume a similar proportion of the 
youngest children also responded along these lines in Experiments 2 and 3, that would 
explain a large chunk of the C-responses (because C “won/came first”), which in these two 
experiments happened to correspond to the correct answer about which object moved first. A 
reduction in the proportion of children responding on this “winner/loser” basis across age 
groups could explain the apparent developmental pattern of younger children appearing to 
give more accurate TOJs in the 3-object pseudocollision than we observed in Experiments 2 
and 3. This account could also explain the differential way in which the causality 
manipulation affected TOJs and CJs—if the aforementioned hypothesis is correct (i.e., some 
proportion of young children are responding on the basis of which object came first/last), 
then it seems likely that the CJ data are valid, and younger child en’s TOJ data are being 
influenced by the nature of the TOJ question being asked and do not reflect their actual 
perception of temporal order. 
Experiment 4 
In Experiment 4 we replicated Experiment 3, but replaced the 2-object control clip 
with a 3-object canonical collision where A was a circle and B and C were squares (just like 
the pseudocollisions in Experiments 2 and 3), so the veridical order of motion was ABC. As 
in Experiments 2 and 3, we asked participants “which square moved first?” If younger 
children are making a genuine TOJ, and are as accurate as they appear to be in Experiments 2 
and 3, then in the canonical clip they should respond “B”. If they still respond “C” then this 
will provide support for the “winner/loser” spatially-based response outlined above.  
To address whether the CJ results in the previous experiments might be explained by 
a tendency to respond “yes” when asked about the 3-object pseudocollision because of the 
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presence of a collision between objects A and B, instead of only asking whether square B 
bumped into square C, for the critical clips we asked about all pairs of squares in a random 
order (i.e., Did A bump into B? Did B bump into C? Did A bump into C?). If participants are 
responding to this question in the way it is intended, for both critical clips participants should 
respond “yes” for A-B and “no” for A-C. They should also respond “yes” when asked about 
B-C in the canonical collision; if they also respond “yes” in the pseudocollision then this will 
provide evidence that participants do indeed perceive the movement of C as caused by B. 
Method 
 Participants. Our final sample consisted of 127 children (65 female); 65 4- to 6-year-
olds, none of whom had participated in Experiments 1—3 (pseudocollision: N = 35, Mage = 5 
years 10 months; canonical collision: N = 30, Mage = 6 years 1 month) and 62 8- to 10-year-
olds (pseudocollision: N = 32, Mage = 8 years 10 months; canonical collision: N = 30, Mage = 
8 years 9 months). An additional 4 children were tested but excluded because they were 
inattentive (N=2), because they could not name the shapes (N=1), or because of experimenter 
error (N=1).  
 Procedure. The practice clips were the same as for Experiment 3 (Figure 1c). The 
critical clips consisted of the 3-object pseudocollision (ACB, Figure 2a[ii]) from Experiments 
2 and 3, and a 3-object canonical collision (ABC, Figure 2c). In the canonical collision, 
object A moved towards object B and stopped adjacent to it, following which B started 
moving towards object C. B stopped adjacent to C, and C started moving away from B. As 
for the pseudocollision, all objects moved at a speed of 30 mm/s. 
 Results.  
Practice clips. Performance in the 2-object practice clips was 72% correct responses 
for 4- to 6-year-olds and 92% correct responses for 8- to 10-year-olds. Performance in the 3-
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object practice clip was 58% correct responses for 4- to 6-year-olds and 84% correct 
responses for 8- to 10-year-olds (see Table S1 for full details). 
Pre-registered confirmatory analyses. Four- to six-year-olds’ TOJs were 
significantly less accurate for the canonical collision where the correct response was ‘B’ 
(23% correct), than for the reordered pseudocollision where the correct response was ‘C’ 
(80% correct, ぬ2 = 20.87, p < 0.001); in fact, they were equally likely to say that C moved 
first for the pseudocollision and the canonical clip (Figure 6). The 8- to 10-year-olds on the 
other hand mostly gave the (correct) response that B moved first in the canonical clip, though 
30% of participants in this age group still erroneously claimed that C moved first in the 
canonical clip (Figure 6). The older children were more likely to respond correctly in the 
canonical clip than in the pseudocollision, but not significantly so (canonical collision: 70% 
correct, pseudocollision: 59% correct, ぬ2 = 0.76, p = 0.382). 
Figure 6 about here 
Participants in both age groups were significantly more likely so respond ‘yes’ when asked 
whether A bumped into B (which it did) compared with when asked whether A bumped into 
C (which it did not), and this was true for both clip types (canonical and reordered, ps <  
0.001 for all, Figure 7). 
Figure 7 about here 
In both age groups and for both types of clip the majority of participants (>80%) responded 
‘yes’ when asked whether B bumped into C (Figure 7). There was no significant difference 
between the responses children in either age group gave for the canonical collision and the 
reordered collision when asked whether square B bumped into square C (4- to 6-year-olds: ぬ2 
= 0.03, p = 0.959; 8- to 10-year-olds: ぬ2 = 0.336, p = 0.562). 
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Exploratory analyses. TOJs and CJs were significantly associated for the 3-object 
pseudocollision—participants who reordered events B and C were more likely to report 
perceiving a collision between those objects (Phi = 0.31, p = 0.013, see Table S2 for details 
per age group).  
Discussion 
Experiment 4 again replicated the developmental pattern of TOJ responses from 
Experiments 2 and 3, with younger children appearing to give more accurate TOJs (saying C 
moved first) than older children for the reordered pseudocollision clip. However, the results 
for the canonical collision strongly suggest that this does not reflect a better ability to 
perceive the veridical order of events in early childhood. When shown a canonical collision, 
older children gave more accurate TOJs than younger children. Specifically, the majority of 
children in the younger age group responded incorrectly to the TOJ question when presented 
with a canonical collision where the correct answer was ‘B’, which strongly suggests that 
they tend to give the response ‘C’ regardless of clip type. Eight- to 10-year-olds on the other 
hand mostly gave the correct response ‘B’ for the canonical collision, though almost 1/3 still 
responded ‘C’, suggesting that the TOJ question may also cause problems for some older 
children. Thus it appears that the majority of young children and some older children may not 
be interpreting the TOJ question (“which square moved first?”) as it was intended; instead 
they appear to respond on the basis of which square ‘came first’, choosing a square on the 
basis of spatial position. Furthermore, as in the previous experiments we did not find the 
expected association between TOJs and CJs for the youngest group of children. 
 In addition to asking whether square B bumped into square C as in Experiments 1–3, 
in Experiment 4 we also asked participants for their collision judgements about the other 
pairs of shapes. This enabled us to establish that children of all of the ages tested do indeed 
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understand the collision question and interpret it correctly (i.e., they are able to correctly 
identify the presence/absence of a ‘bump’ between object pairs) – they typically say ‘yes’ 
when asked whether A bumped into B, and ‘no’ when asked whether A bumped into C. 
Interestingly, > 80 % of participants in both age groups reported (incorrectly) that B did 
bump into C in the pseudocollision. Given that a comparable percentage of participants gave 
this response for the canonical collision, this provides strong evidence that the causal 
impression generated by the pseudocollision is similar to that generated by the canonical 
collision. 
General Discussion 
Across four experiments we investigated whether children, like adults, reorder events 
in line with causality. We modified an existing adult paradigm (Bechlivanidis & Lagnado, 
2016) for this purpose: in each experiment participants watched a 3-object pseudocollision in 
which the order of events was manipulated so that, unlike in a canonical collision, the third 
object in line (C) moved before the middle object (B) (i.e., the order of motion onset was 
ACB, and object B never collided with object C). They were then asked (a) a temporal order 
judgement (TOJ) question and (b) a collision judgement (CJ) question (three in Experiment 
4). If participants reorder events in line with causality, then they should incorrectly report that 
B moved before C. If the introduction of A affects whether they perceive a collision between 
B and C, they should also incorrectly report that B bumped into C.  
Overall, we found evidence that the causality manipulation affected children’s 
perception of the order of events in the sequence. Across all four experiments participants in 
all age groups (including adults) were significantly more likely to report perceiving a 
collision between objects B and C in the 3-object pseudocollision than in the 2-object control 
clip, despite the spatiotemporal relations between B and C being identical in the two clips. 
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Furthermore, CJs did not differ significantly between age groups (apart from in Experiment 
1, where 9- to 10-year-olds were more likely to report a collision than 7- to 9-year-olds). We 
also found evidence for reordering according to our TOJ measure in the majority of age 
groups: from 4 years in Experiment 1, from 8 years in Experiment 2, and from 6 years in 
Experiment 3. However, our two measures were not consistently associated with one another 
(see supplementary Table S7) and the TOJ data from the younger children showed an 
interesting pattern of results that warrants further discussion.  
Although TOJ response in Experiment 1 provided evidence for reordering in all age 
groups, taken at face value the subsequent TOJ results from Experiments 2 and 3 suggested 
that younger children did not reorder events, and may in fact have been more accurate than 
older children and adults in their perception of the order of events. However, Experiment 4 
demonstrated that some children—particularly in the younger age range—had a systematic 
tendency to respond based on spatial rather than temporal information when asked “Which 
square moved first?” Specifically, when shown a canonical collision where the order of 
motion onset was ABC, the majority of young children still reported that C moved first (i.e., 
before B). Thus, it appears that some children respond on the basis of which square ‘came 
first’, rather than which started to move first. This basis for responding can also explain the 
large proportion of young children saying that object A started moving last in Experiment 
1—in this case, A ‘came last’.  
Despite deliberately avoiding use of the terms ‘before’ or ‘after’ in our TOJ questions, 
our results demonstrate that, at least under these circumstances, asking which object moved 
first/last is also not an appropriate measure of very young children’s temporal order 
perception in this context (i.e., when there is a possible spatial interpretation of the question). 
The general idea that young children are likely to (erroneously) focus on spatial rather than 
temporal cues has a long history within developmental psychology (Piaget, 1969; see 
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McCormack, 2015, for historical review). The current findings add to the body of evidence 
that suggests that young children may privilege spatial information, perhaps because of the 
more concrete nature of spatial cues (Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2007; Casasanto, 
Fotakopoulou, & Boroditsky, 2010). 
However, Experiment 4 also confirmed that young children’s collision judgements 
were valid: following the canonical clip, they were able to accurately identify the presence 
(between A and B) and absence (between A and C) of a ‘bump’ between objects. Taken 
together with the CJ results for Experiments 1-3, this suggests that the inclusion of object A 
generates a causal impression that modulates children’s experience of the subsequent motion 
of B and C. In Experiment 4, children in both age groups were equally likely to report 
perceiving a collision between B and C in the pseudocollision (where there was no collision 
between these objects) and in a 3-object canonical collision (where there actually was a 
collision between B and C). This suggests that for 4- to 10-year-olds, as for adults, the 
pseudocollision generates the same impression of causality as a genuine collision.  
What then should we conclude about the developmental profile of the reordering 
effect? Setting aside the data from the youngest age group (4- to 6-year-olds), there was no 
evidence across Experiments 1—3 that susceptibility to the causal reordering effect increases 
with age. This suggests that causal reordering is present in children, as it is in adults, and that 
it remains stable over development. The key issue is whether we should conclude that this 
effect is also present in early childhood, in 4- to 6-year-olds. As we have pointed out, across 
four experiments the CJ data from this age group consistently suggested that they are as 
likely as older children and adults to mistakenly report that B collided with C in the 3-object 
clip. The data from Experiment 4 indicate that there is no reason to assume that the causality 
manipulation genuinely had a differential effect on young children’s collision perception and 
their temporal order perception; rather, their temporal order judgements w re unreliable. The 
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4- to 6-year-olds’ performance in the 3-object practice clips—where it was not possible to 
respond on the basis of a spatial strategy—were poor compared with other age groups, 
suggesting that children in this age group may have difficulties tracking and remembering the 
order of motion onset of three objects. Thus, the most conservative conclusion is that we do 
not yet know whether 4- to 6-year-olds show the causal reordering effect. However, taken 
alongside children’s CJ data, we believe that the findings of Experiment 1 provide a good 
reason for believing that causal reordering is indeed evident in this age group. Unlike in 
Experiments 2—4, we can exclude children in Experiment 1 who responded to the TOJ 
question on the basis of spatial position: these are the children who reported that A started 
moving last. Indeed, our existing analysis excluded these children (based on our pre-
registered confirmatory analysis plan), and a substantial majority of the remaining children in 
this group (76%) reported that C was the last object to move in the 3-object pseudocollision 
clip (but not in the 2-object clip). Thus, the findings of Experiment 1 suggest that causal 
reordering is present even in 4- to 6-year-olds.    
 In sum, we believe that our findings provide evidence for an early-developing role of 
causality in interpreting the environment. While infants’ causal perception has previously 
been shown to be influenced by bottom-up visual factors in a comparable way to adults’ (e.g., 
the grouping effect, Choi & Scholl, 2004; Newman et al., 2008), the present study 
demonstrates that children’s causal perception can also exert top-down effects on their 
temporal perception, as is the case for adults (Bechlivanidis & Lagnado, 2016). This evidence 
that causality can influence children’s experience of time is in keeping with recent research 
showing that children as young as four years are susceptible to temporal binding—with 
children predicting that events will occur earlier if they are causally connected to a preceding 
event, compared to when it is preceded by an arbitrary predictive signal (Blakey et al., 2018). 
Thus, it appears that not only do children use temporal cues to make causal judgements (e.g., 
Development of Causal Reordering 
37 
 
Bullock & Gelman, 1979; McCormack et al., 2015; Mendelson & Shultz, 1976; Rankin & 
McCormack, 2013; Schlottmann et al., 1999); they also use causal cues to make temporal 
judgements—about the duration between events, and about the order in which events 
occurred.  
Although the results presented in the current study are illuminating with respect to the 
developmental trajectory of causal reordering, important questions remain regarding the 
mechanism underpinning the effect. Properly answering these questions is beyond the scope 
of the present study, and will require developing new paradigms to distinguish between 
possible explanations of the reordering effect. Nevertheless, in what follows we outline these 
different potential explanations, discuss what has been established to date, and describe our 
ongoing work with adults that aims to generate new evidence to definitively distinguish 
between these alternative explanations.  
There are three distinct types of explanation that might account for the reordering 
effect, which are set out by Bechlivanidis and Lagnado (2016). First, it is possible that when 
viewing the 3-object pseudocollision participants fail to see all of the events and so they do 
not actually perceive their order (inattention). Specifically, it is plausible that the motion of 
object B could be missed, as attention is diverted by the motion onset of object C. On such an 
explanation, reordering occurs because participants ‘fill in’ the missing information by 
making a post hoc inference on the basis of the most likely order of events, given their causal 
impression. Arguably this is the least interesting explanation of the effect, because it suggests 
that participants simply speculate about what might have happened, rather than their 
judgments being based on processing the events that they were presented with. Second, the 
reordering effect could occur if participants do attend to and accurately perceive the order of 
all events, but because of the causal impression generated by the clip, the memory of events 
they ultimately retrieve is of the more plausible causal order (misremembering). Finally, it 
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may be the case that participants’ original representation of the temporal order of events 
matches the causal order rather than the objective order—i.e., they actually perceive events 
happening in an order that does not reflect reality (misperceiving). This last possibility is 
particularly interesting, because it challenges what might be seen as the intuitive view of 
perception, namely that events are perceived in the order in which they occur, so that the 
temporal structure of experience simply mirrors the temporal structure of events in the world 
(Hoerl, 2013; Phillips, 2014). 
Previous findings with adults speak against the inattention account of reordering (that 
participants do not attend to all of the objects in the pseudocollision). When participants first 
watch a pseudocollision, and are subsequently presented with a pseudocollison and a 
canonical collision side by side, they tend to mistake the pseudocollision they initially saw 
for the canonical collision. In contrast, when they are first presented with a slightly modified 
pseudocollision clip in which B does not move at all, this is detected by most people and they 
are able to identify it as the clip they saw, rather than mistaking it for a canonical collision 
(Experiment 2, Bechlivanidis & Lagnado, 2016). This suggests that participants apparently 
do attend to the behaviour of object B—they are not simply filling in missing information 
post hoc because they did not see what happened. However, this study could not distinguish 
between ‘misremembering’ and ‘misperceiving’ accounts of the reordering effect. 
Distinguishing between these two accounts is difficult because in the studies to date 
participants have made their judgments after the events have happened. Ideally, in order to 
examine what participants perceive (rather than what they construct in memory), a paradigm 
would be used that taps into the processes that occur while the events themselves unfold. 
However, given the very short time scales over which the events happen, such a paradigm 
could not involve participants making explicit verbal judgments, as such judgments are by 
necessity post-hoc. We are currently testing a paradigm with adults that we believe taps into 
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the processes that occur as the events unfold, in which participants have to synchronize the 
occurrence of another unrelated event with the onset of movement of B or C. In this task, 
participants are given multiple opportunities to view the pseudocollision and adjust the timing 
of the unrelated event so that they perceive it as occurring simultaneously either with the 
movement of B or the movement of C. If causal reordering stems from a genuine perceptual 
effect (participants perceive B moving before C), then the temporal location of events should 
be shifted to match causal assumptions—when synching with B, participants should place the 
unrelated event earlier than the actual onset of B’s motion, and when synching with C they 
should place the unrelated event later than the actual onset of motion. If instead participants 
accurately perceive the order of events (they perceive C moving before B) and it is only later 
that their causal impression interferes with their temporal order judgement, then their 
placements of the unrelated event should reflect the veridical timing of B’s and C’s motion 
onset.  
Depending on our adult findings, we hope to subsequently explore whether this task 
can also be adapted for use with children, although the task is likely to be more challenging 
than the one used in the current study because of the need for multiple trials in which 
millisecond timing adjustments are made (though see Blakey et al., 2018). We should 
emphasize, though, that in our view the developmental profile of the reordering effect is 
interesting regardless of whether a misremembering or misperceiving explanation of it is 
correct. This is because, regardless of which of these explanations is correct, reordering 
serves as a novel demonstration of how causal assumptions have top-down effects on basic 
processes. Establishing whether such assumptions play a similar role in children sheds light 
on the extent to which causal cognition plays a similar fundamental role from early in 
development.  
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Thus, the current findings are informative with regards to children’s causal reasoning 
abilities more broadly. First, our results add to the small body of work suggesting that 
children’s perception of physical causation is largely similar to that of adults (Schlottmann, 
Allan, et al., 2002; Schlottmann, Cole, et al., 2013). Previous research has used simple two-
object displays and indicated that the introduction of delays or spatial gaps reduces the 
likelihood that children perceive physical causation (Schlottmann et al., 2013); in this respect 
children largely resemble adults. However, the pseudocollision presented to children in the 
present study apparently generated a causal impression (as participants reported that B 
bumped into C), even though no contact was made and C moved before B. As with adult 
findings (Bechlivanidis & Lagnado, 2016), these results suggest that, rather than causal 
impressions being determined only by the basic spatial-temporal properties of object 
movement, schemata—in this case, a series of collisions—are used in a top-down manner in 
the interpretation of perceptual displays. Such schemata appear to be used in the same way in 
young children as in adults. Second, a large body of previous work has demonstrated that 
young children are able to use the causal structure of events in the world to make inferences 
and guide their behaviour (e.g., Muentener & Schulz, 2016; Sobel & Legare, 2014). Causal 
reasoning has been proposed to play an important role in diverse domains, including 
children’s understanding of the physical world (e.g., Baillargeon, 2004), the development of 
morality (e.g., Hamlin, 2013), and the generation of explanations (e.g., Legare, 2012). The 
present study extends the evidence on the influence of causality on children’s experience of 
the world to another domain: their experience of time. Thus, the current results add to a 
growing body of evidence that causality plays a fundamental role in our experience of the 
world from early in development. 
On the assumption that the present study has demonstrated that children as young as 
four years reorder events to match a causal interpretation, further work is needed to establish 
Development of Causal Reordering 
41 
 
the developmental origins of this temporal illusion. For example, a habituation paradigm 
could be used to test whether or not infants discriminate between a canonical 3-object 
collision and the reordered pseuodocollision. There would also be value in developing a 
paradigm appropriate for comparative studies to enable investigation of the evolutionary 
origins of causal reordering. While ‘higher’ causal knowledge and inference has been 
reasonably widely explored in non-human animals (e.g., Seed & Call, 2009), there have been 
relatively few studies of causal perception. Recent research has demonstrated that 
chimpanzees are susceptible to causal capture, in which a causal impression can induce 
perceptual alteration of the spatiotemporal properties of co-occurring events (Matsuno & 
Tomonaga, 2017; Scholl & Nakamaya, 2002). This provides initial evidence that causality 
also influences the visual perception of our closest ape relatives, but just how 
phylogenetically widespread susceptibility to causality-based temporal illusions might be 
remains an open question. 
To conclude, the findings reported in the present study add to a small but growing 
body of evidence demonstrating an early-developing bidirectional relation between time and 
causality (Blakey et al., 2018; Lorimer et al., 2017). The current study extends this research 
by showing that children’s causal impressions can qualitatively alter their temporal 
experience—through the reordering of events to match a causal interpretation. 
References 
Baillargeon, R. (2004). Infants’ Physical World. Current Directions in Psychological 
Science, 13(3), 89–94. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0963-7214.2004.00281.x 
Bechlivanidis, C. (2015). The arrow of time through the causal lens: When causal beliefs 
determine temporal order. Doctoral dissertation, UCL (University College London). 
Development of Causal Reordering 
42 
 
Bechlivanidis, C. & Lagnado, D. A. (2016). Time reordered: Causal perception guides the 
interpretation of temporal order, Cognition, 146, 58-66. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2015.09.001 
Bechlivanidis, C., & Lagnado, D. A. (2013). Does the “why” tell us the ‘‘when”? 
Psychological Science, 24(8), 1563-1572. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797613476046 
Bechlivanidis, C., Schlottmann, A., Lagnado, D.A. (2019) Causation Without Realism 
Journal Of Experimental Psychology: General, 148(5), 785-804. doi: 
10.1037/xge0000602 
Blakey, E., Tecwyn, E. C., McCormack, T., Lagnado, D. A., Hoerl, C., Lorimer, S. & 
Buehner, M. J. (2018) When Causality Shapes the Experience of Time: Evidence for 
Temporal Binding in Young Children. Developmental Science, e12769. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/desc.12769 
Blything, L. P., & Cain, K. (2016). Children’s processing and comprehension of complex 
sentences containing temporal connectives: The influence of memory on the time 
course of accurate responses. Developmental Psychology, 52(10), 1517. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0000201 
Blything, L. P., Davies, R., & Cain, K. (2015). Young children's comprehension of temporal 
relations in complex sentences: The influence of memory on performance. Child 
Development, 86(6), 1922-1934. DOI: 10.1111/cdev.12412 
Borhani, K., Beck, B., & Haggard, P. (2017). Choosing, doing, and controlling: implicit sense 
of agency over somatosensory events. Psychological Science, 28(7), 882-893. 
10.1177/0956797617697693 
Development of Causal Reordering 
43 
 
Buehner, M. J., (2012). Understanding the past, predicting the future: Causation, not 
intentional action, is the root of temporal binding. Psychological Science, 23, 1490-
1497. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797612444612 
Buehner, M. J. (2015). Awareness of voluntary and involuntary causal actions and their 
outcomes. Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice, 2(3), 237-
252. DOI:10.1037/cns0000068 
Buehner, M. J., & Humphreys, G. R. (2009). Causal binding of actions to their effects. 
Psychological Science, 20, 1221-1228. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2009.02435.x 
Buehner, M. J., & May, J. (2003). Rethinking temporal contiguity and the judgement of 
causality: Effects of prior knowledge, experience, and reinforcement procedure. The 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A, 56(5), 865-890. 
DOI:10.1080/02724980244000675 
Bullock, M., & Gelman, R. (1979). Preschool children’s assumptions about cause and effect: 
temporal ordering. Child Development, 50, 89–96. DOI: 10.2307/1129045. 
Casasanto, D., & Boroditsky, L. (2007). Time in the mind: Using space to think about time. 
Cognition, 106, 579-593. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2007.03.004 
Casansanto, D., Fotakopoulou, O., & Boroditsky, L. (2010). Space and time in the child’s 
mind: Evidence for a cross-dimensional asymmetry. Cognitive Science, 34, 387-405. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1551-6709.2010.01094.x 
Cavazzana, A., Begliomini, C., & Bisiacchi, P. S. (2014). Intentional binding effect in 
children: insights from a new paradigm. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8, 651. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2014.00651 
Development of Causal Reordering 
44 
 
Cavazzana, A., Begliomini, C., & Bisiacchi, P. S. (2017). Intentional binding as a marker of 
agency across the lifespan. Consciousness and Cognition, 52, 104-114. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2017.04.016 
Choi, H., & Scholl, B. J. (2004). Effects of grouping and attention on the perception of 
causality. Perception & Psychophysics, 66(6), 926-942. DOI: 10.3758/BF03194985 
Cohen, L. B., & Amsel, G. (1998). Precursors to infants' perception of the causality of a 
simple event. Infant Behavior and Development, 21(4), 713-731. DOI: 
10.1016/S0163-6383(98)90040-6 
Desantis, A., Waszak, F., Moutsopoulou, K., & Haggard, P. (2016). How action structures 
time: about the perceived temporal order of action and predicted 
outcomes. Cognition, 146, 100-109. DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2015.08.011 
Faro, D., McGill, A. L., & Hastie, R. (2013). The influence of perceived causation on 
judgements of time: an integrative review and implications for decision-
making. Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 217. DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00217 
Hamlin, J. K. (2013). Moral Judgment and Action in Preverbal Infants and Toddlers: 
Evidence for an Innate Moral Core. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 
22(3), 186–193. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721412470687 
Hoerl, C. (2013). A succession of feelings, in and of itself, is not a feeling of succession. 
Mind, 122 (486) (2013), pp. 373-417, 10.1093/mind/fzt070 
Lagnado, D. A., & Sloman, S. A. (2006). Time as a guide to cause. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 32(3), 451. DOI: 10.1037/0278-
7393.32.3.451 
Development of Causal Reordering 
45 
 
Legare, C.H. (2012). Exploring explanation: explaining inconsistent evidence informs 
exploratory, hypothesis-testing behavior in young children. Child Development, 83 1, 
173-85. DOI:10.1111/j.1467-8624.2011.01691.x 
Leslie, A. M., & Keeble, S. (1987). Do six-month-old infants perceive 
causality? Cognition, 25(3), 265-288. DOI: 10.1016/S0010-0277(87)80006-9 
Lorimer, S., McCormack, T., Blakey, E., Lagnado, D. A., Hoerl, C., Tecwyn, E.C., & 
Buehner, M. J. (under review). The Developmental Profile of Temporal Binding: 
From Childhood to Adulthood. 
Mascalzoni, E., Regolin, L., Vallortigara, G., & Simion, F. (2013). The cradle of causal 
reasoning: newborns’ preference for physical causality. Developmental Science, 16(3), 
327-335. https://doi.org/10.1111/desc.12018 
Matsuno, T., & Tomonaga, M. (2017). Causal capture effects in chimpanzees (Pan 
troglodytes). Cognition, 158, 153-164. DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2016.10.023 
McCormack, T. (2015). The development of temporal cognition. Handbook of Child 
Psychology and Developmental Science, 2, 624-670. 
Mendelson, R., & Shultz, T. R. (1976). Covariation and temporal contiguity as principles of 
causal inference in young children. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 22(3), 
408-412. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0965(76)90104-1 
Merchant, H., & Yarrow, K. (2016). How the motor system both encodes and influences our 
sense of time. Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences, 8, 22-27. DOI: 
10.1016/j.cobeha.2016.01.006 
Muentener, P., & Bonawitz, E. (2017). The Development of Causal Reasoning. In Waldman, 
M. R.. (Ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Causal Reasoning. Oxford University Press.  
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199399550.013.40  
Development of Causal Reordering 
46 
 
Newman, G. E., Choi, H., Wynn, K., & Scholl, B. J. (2008). The origins of causal perception: 
Evidence from postdictive processing in infancy. Cognitive Psychology, 57(3), 262-
291. DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2008.02.003 
Oakes, L. M. (1994). Development of infants' use of continuity cues in their perception of 
causality. Developmental Psychology, 30(6), 869. DOI: 10.1037/0012-1649.30.6.869 
Phillips, I. (2014). Experience of and in Time. Philosophy Compass, 9(2), 131–144. 
Piaget, J. (1969). The child’s conception of time. London: Routledge and Keegan Paul. 
R Core Team (2017). R: A language and environment for statistical computing. R Foundation 
for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria. URL https://www.R-project.org/. 
Rankin, M. L., & McCormack, T. (2013). The temporal priority principle: at what age does 
this develop? Frontiers in Psychology, 4. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00178. 
Saxe, R., & Carey, S. (2006). The perception of causality in infancy. Acta 
Psychologica, 123(1-2), 144-165. DOI: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2006.05.005 
Schlottmann, A. (1999). Seeing in happen and knowing how it works: how children 
understand the relation between perceptual causality and underlying mechanism. 
Developmental Psychology, 35, 303-317. DOI: 10.1037/0012-1649.35.1.303 
Schlottmann, A., Allen, D., Linderoth, C., & Hesketh, S. (2002). Perceptual causality in 
children. Child Development, 73, 1656-1677. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-
8624.00497 
Schlottmann, A., Cole, K., Watts, R., & White, M. (2013). Domain-specific perceptual 
causality in children depends on the spatio-temporal configuration, not motion 
onset. Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 365. DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00365 
Development of Causal Reordering 
47 
 
Scholl, B. J., & Nakayama, K. (2002). Causal capture: Contextual effects on the perception of 
collision events. Psychological Science, 13(6), 493-498. DOI: 10.1111/1467-
9280.00487 
Seed, A., & Call, J. (2009). Causal knowledge for events and objects in animals. In Rational 
Animals, Irrational Humans (pp. 173-188). Keio University. 
Sobel, D. M., & Legare, C. H. (2014). Causal learning in children. Wiley Interdisciplinary 
Reviews: Cognitive Science, 5(4), 413-427. 
White, P. A. (2018). Perceptual impressions of causality are affected by common fate. 












Development of Causal Reordering 
48 
 
Table 1. Summary of results comparing performance in the 2-object control clip and the 3-
object pseudocollision for all age groups in Experiments 1—3 for the temporal order judgement 
(TOJ) and collision judgement (CJ) measures.  
   Age Group   
 Measure 4 to 6 6 to 7 7 to 9 9 to 10 Adult 
Exp. 1 TOJ ぬ2 = 29.89 
p < 0.001 
ぬ2 = 32.61 
p < 0.001 
ぬ2 = 28.13 
p < 0.001 
ぬ2 = 40.24 
p < 0.001 
ぬ2 = 15.99 
p < 0.001 
 CJ ぬ2 = 10.56 
p = 0.001 
ぬ2 = 15.59 
p < 0.001 
ぬ2 = 17.21 
p < 0.001 
ぬ2 = 32.94 
p < 0.001 
ぬ2 = 18.28 
p < 0.001 
   Age Group   
 Measure 4 to 6 6 to 8 8 to 10  Adults 
Exp. 2 TOJ  
p = 0.238 a 
 
p = 0.082 a 
ぬ2 = 8.72 
p = 0.003 
 ぬ2 = 16.31 
p < 0.001 
 CJ ぬ2 = 13.89 
p < 0.001 
ぬ2 = 9.67 
p = 0.002 
ぬ2 = 7.33 
p = 0.007 
 ぬ2 = 13.12 
p < 0.001 
Exp. 3 TOJ  
p = 0.108 a 
 
p = 0.002a 
ぬ2 = 22.70 
p < 0.001 
 ぬ2 = 12.83 
p < 0.001 
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Figure 1. Schematic representations of example practice clips seen by participants in (a) 
Experiment 1, (b) Experiment 2 and (c) Experiments 3 and 4, and the TOJ question they were 
asked after each clip. Direction of motion shown is left-to-right, but could also be right-to-left. 
The colours of the objects were randomized between participants. Clips were presented in a 
random order. In Experiment 1 participants saw two clips of each type (3-object and 2-object; 
4 in total) and motion onset order of the shapes was random. They were either asked about 
which square started moving last or first, with the order alternating between clips. In 
Experiment 2 participants saw one clip of each type and the circle always moved first in the 3-
object clip. In Experiments 3 and 4 participants saw one 3-object clip where the square always 
moved first, and two 2-object clips: one where the circle moved first and one where the square 












Figure 2. Schematic representations of (a) the 3-object pseudocollision clip used in [i] 
Experiment 1 and [ii] Experiments 2—4; (b) the 2-object control clip used in Experiments 1—
3; and (c) the 3-object canonical collision used in Experiment 4, and the TOJ and CJ questions 
participants were asked after each clip. Direction of motion shown is left-to-right, but could 
also be right-to-left. The colours of the objects were randomised between participants. In 
Experiment 2 the colours used were orange, blue and grey (not shown). In Experiment 4, 
participants were asked a CJ question about each pair of shapes (in a random order) for the 
pseudocollision and the canonical collision, so for the example shown for the latter they would 
also have been asked whether the yellow circle bumped into the red square, and whether the 
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    (a) Exp. 1 Temporal order judgements   (b) Exp. 1 Collision judgements 
 
       
Figure 3. Percentage of participants in each age group who gave the correct response in (a) 
the temporal order judgement question (square B); and (b) the collision judgement question 
(no), in the 2-object control clip (red bars/left-hand bar for each age group) and 3-object 
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     (a) Exp. 2 Temporal order judgements   (b) Exp. 2 Collision judgements 
 
         
 
Figure 4. Percentage of participants in each age group who gave the correct response in (a) 
the temporal order judgement question (square C); and (b) the collision judgement question 
(no) in the 2-object control clip (red bars/left-hand bar for each age group) and 3-object 
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     (a) Exp. 3 Temporal order judgements   (b) Exp. 3 Collision judgements 
 
         
 
Figure 5. Percentage of participants in each age group who gave the correct response in (a) the 
temporal order judgement question (square C); and (b) the collision judgement question (no) 
in the 2-object control clip (red bars/left-hand bar for each age group) and 3-object 


















Figure 6. Percentage of participants in each age group of Experiment 4 who gave the correct 
response for the temporal order judgement question for the canonical collision (red bars/left-
hand bar for each age group, correct answer was B) and the reordered collision (blue bars/right-














Figure 7. Percentage of participants in each age group who responded ‘yes’ to each of the three 
causal impression questions for the canonical collision (red bars/left-hand bar for each age 
group) and the reordered pseudocollision (blue bars/right-hand bar for each age group). 
 
